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A B S T R A C T
This paper discusses the prospects for developing production and innovation capabilities arising from renewable
electrification efforts. This discussion falls at the intersection of several literatures within innovation studies and
development studies. It requires a combination of ideas from across several academic fields of study. This paper
focuses on value chain linkages and interactive learning. Because this is largely unexplored terrain, the paper
seeks to provide conceptual framing based on insights from the literature and it discusses whether linkages
within the global South offer specific advantages over North–South linkages. It then uses this conceptual framing
to draw insights from the case of renewable electrification with wind and solar PV in Kenya. It ends by iden-
tifying key avenues for promoting interactive learning in this context.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the potential for more effective and appropriate
linkages has resurfaced as a prominent topic as developing countries
become increasingly interconnected by economic flows: importing ca-
pital goods (Hanlin and Kaplinsky, 2016), engaging in value chains
(UNCTAD, 2015) and undertaking foreign direct investments (FDIs)
(Arita, 2013). This has received renewed attention as a means of pro-
gress with respect to the sustainable development goals (SDGs), in-
cluding those of ensuring access to affordable and sustainable energy to
all (Goal 7) and promoting sustainable industrialisation and fostering
innovation (Goal 9).
The overall objective of this paper is to inform policy-driven re-
search that ultimately aims to create and deepen synergies between
these two SDGs, thereby facilitating a process of ‘low carbon develop-
ment’ (Lema et al., 2015; Urban and Nordensvärd, 2013). Within this
terrain, the paper is concerned with the following. Generally, it is
concerned with the creation of relevant (‘developmental’ or ‘inclusive’)
pathways and associated economic activities involved in clean energy
provision. Specifically, it is focused on the ‘learning opportunities’ that
may provide in the context of renewable electrification. Learning is
understood here as the accumulation of relevant capabilities; we are
informed by the increasing body of literature that emphasises the
importance of local production and innovation capabilities for effective
low carbon development (Ockwell and Mallett, 2013; Urban and
Nordensvärd, 2013; de Coninck and Sagar, 2015).
Given the importance ascribed to such capabilities in the literature,
there is relatively little attention to ‘where’ and ‘how’ such capabilities
arise in local economies, particularly the role of interactive learning as
a means to building these production and innovation capabilities. In
this paper, we therefore address the following closely related issues:
• First, we address the issue of local capability formation in the con-
text of low carbon electrification technologies in developing coun-
tries. Large investments are made in renewable energy in developing
countries, not least in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia where
access to energy is a top priority on the policy agenda. Clearly, the
levels and types of pre-existing capabilities are of crucial importance
for the success of these investments. However, we are not focused
(primarily) on such existing capabilities, but instead on the oppor-
tunities for further capability formation arising in and from such
investments.
• Second, given the gap in resources and capabilities between ad-
vanced and developing economies and because of global governance
mechanisms in support of the SDGs, there is a de facto high degree of
inbound flows of ‘technology’ related to these investments. We
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therefore focus on the learning opportunities that may potentially
arise in and around the linkages that facilitate these flows.
• Third, we address the issue of linkages between emerging econo-
mies, such as China, India or South Africa, and poorer parts of the
world. In the 1980s economists began to argue that ‘South-South
technology transfers offer undoubted advantages since the tech-
nologies exported are better adapted to the needs of the developing
countries’ (Sabolo, 1983, p. 606). Considering the many years in
which South–South technology transfer and co-operation for cli-
mate-relevant technologies has been on the agenda, the literature
provides surprisingly little empirical evidence on this. We argue that
the relative lack of progress in shedding light on the third issue so
far is the difficulty of framing it and connecting it to the first two
issues.
This paper therefore starts, in Section 2, providing background for
the discussion by outlining the challenges of creating access to elec-
tricity in low and middle-income countries and South–South flows of
trade and investment in this respect. Section 3 provides an outline of
the key conceptual building blocks from across the innovation studies
and development studies fields. It draws on and seeks to bring together
perspectives from the literatures on technology transfer, interactive
learning, global value chains (GVCs) and appropriate technology.
Section 4 seeks to recast international technology transfer as occurring
in value chain relations with opportunities for interactive learning be-
tween users (importers) and producers (exporters) of electrification
technology. Section 5 then seeks to go deeper by considering typical
value chain structures in and around renewable electrification projects,
using the case of wind and solar photovoltaic in Kenya as an example,
drawing on new vocabulary for analysing capability formation in the
context of renewable electrification. Section 6 concludes by high-
lighting the key insights of the paper, asking what the implications are
for South–South discourse and emphasising different types of interac-
tions for local capability formation and the importance of local shaping
of technology as key areas of attention for those involved in researching
or promoting low carbon development activities.
2. Renewable electrification
We start by providing a background to the drive to create access to
electricity and the importance of South–South connections in green
energy, particularly electrification. This provides an essential founda-
tion for later analyses of whether and how investment in the field can
be harnessed for local capability formation.
2.1. Access to energy
One of the most critical issues to development in low and middle-
income countries is access to energy, not least in sub-Saharan Africa
and South Asia. Electrification is one of the most critical issues here. In
total, more than one billion people do not have access to electricity.
Sub-Saharan Africa has an electrification rate of 32% and in rural areas
it is just 17% according to the International Environmental Agency (see
Table 1).
Fossil fuel and renewable energy sources will be used to bring
electricity to poor countries and rural areas within them. Renewable
energy sources are particularly high on policy agendas, however, due to
the foreseen socio-economic development opportunities in terms of
local employment and industrial development. As seen in Table 2, hy-
dropower is the predominant renewable energy source in sub-Saharan
Africa. While starting from a much lower base, wind and solar are
growing much faster, with wind moving forward at a compounded
annual growth rate of almost 23% while solar grew 73% between 2010
and 2015. In terms of added capacity, hydropower amounted to
2.17 GW compared to 2.01 GW of wind and 1.45 GW of solar photo-
voltaic (PV) in the same period.
Table 2 also shows projections for growth. Scenario 1 is linear
growth whereas scenarios 2–4 are pessimistic (25%), middle ground
(50%) and optimistic (75%) realisation rates of project pipelines. With
all the scenarios, there are massive investments in renewable energy on
the African continent currently and in the foreseeable future.
There are various ways in which these investments are organised to
increase rural and renewable electrification. First, there are those fo-
cused on grid connection. These are typically large hydro and solar
projects. For these to make a difference for rural communities they need
to be combined with extension of grids into areas that currently do not
have access. Second, there are mini grids where self-contained grids are
established in rural villages, using micro hydro, solar and micro wind,
or a mix of these. Finally, there are various off-grid solutions where
electricity generation is tied to the household or factory – typically solar
rooftop or other solar stand-alone solutions, sometimes combined with
micro wind. These off-grid solutions range from small solar home sys-
tems that power a couple of lights and can charge a mobile phone to
stand-alone systems that power factories or public institutions.
Electrification in Africa will involve all of these pathways, but the
question is about the balance between them and about how they are set





Region Population without electricity millions Electrification rate % Urban electrification rate % Rural electrification rate %
Developed countries 1 100% 100% 100%
Developing countries 1200 78% 92% 67%
Sub-Saharan Africa 634 32% 59% 17%
Developing Asia 526 86% 96% 78%
India 237 81% 96% 74%
Latin America 22 95% 98% 85%
Middle East 17 92% 98% 79%
World 1201 83% 95% 70%
Note: Electricity access in 2013 – Regional aggregates.
Table 2
Renewable energy in Africa: installed capacity and projections.
Source: AEEP Power Project Database/AEEP (2016).









(Linear) (25%) (50%) (75%)
Hydro 33.01 35.18 37.36 41.97 48.63 55.30
Wind 1.12 3.13 5.14 4.93 6.62 8.30
Solar 0.10 1.55 2.99 3.25 4.61 5.96
Other 0.95 1.50 2.05 2.49 2.94 2.98
Note: Other = Geothermal, biomass.
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2.2. International trade and investments in renewable energy
Southern-based suppliers of component parts or whole systems in
grid connected, mini grid and off-grid solutions are increasing annually
in Africa. Inbound flows (from countries not only in the Global South,
but also in the Global North) to Africa comprise trade, FDIs and foreign
indirect investments, i.e. private capital investments or development
finance. Data specifically on South–South trade and investment flows in
renewable energy into the African continent is difficult to obtain. It is
clear, however, that such flows are significant and growing in im-
portance.
2.2.1. Trade flows
South–South trade in solar PV (cells and modules), wind turbines
and hydropower is growing faster than global trade in the same sectors
(UNEP, 2014). Africa is a relatively small importer (compared to Asia
and Latin America), but in absolute terms, energy equipment imports
are significant. African countries collectively imported wind turbines to
the amount of US$342 million from other developing countries in the
period 2009–2013. The largest importers were South Africa, Ethiopia
and Egypt (UNEP). China exported PV cells and modules to African
countries worth US$869 million in the period 2009–2013, with South
Africa as the largest importer.
Looking a little deeper at Southern country exporters of PV cells and
modules, we find that South Africa, the African country with the most
solar generated electricity, had a significant rise in Chinese imports
between 2005 and 2011 as compared to the top solar PV exporting
countries in the Global North (see Fig. 1). The same is true of Kenya,
which is well-known for its growth in off-grid small-scale solar home
systems (see Fig. 2).
A similar picture can be found for wind turbine imports into Africa.
Utilising trade data for wind turbines, we can see that for South Africa
(also Africa's largest market for wind as per 2016 rankings) imports of
Chinese turbines increased significantly in the period after 2010 as
compared to those from the USA or Denmark (the other top producers of
wind turbines in the world) (see Table 3). A similar story is true also in
Kenya (although figures are only available until 2013 on UN Comtrade),
while in Ethiopia, China has been the biggest importer of wind turbines
by a significant margin since data started to be collected in 2005. 2.2.2. Foreign direct investment and foreign indirect investment
In terms of FDI, Chinese power projects in sub-Saharan Africa cover
the whole electricity mix except for nuclear. Fifty-six per cent of the
projects of additional generation capacity completed, under construc-
tion or planned over the 2010–2020 period use renewable energy
sources, essentially from hydro (49%), while other renewables (7%)
reflect a relatively small share. However, it is difficult to track smaller
projects, such as typical mini-grid projects (International Energy
Agency, 2016, p. 12). In 2009, China announced that it would set up
100 clean energy projects across Africa, including some small-scale
solar projects (Shen and Power, 2016). Such investments are much
needed. Sub-Saharan Africa's electricity sector is projected to require
capital investment of about US$835 billion by 2040 to enhance the
generation, transmission and distribution (T&D) capacity, which is es-
sential to supply the growing electricity demand and specified elec-
trification targets (Castellano et al., 2015). Table 4 provides details of
China's current power project portfolio in sub-Saharan Africa.
The literature on investments in the power sector in Africa under-
taken by Chinese companies shows that investments have increased
significantly over the past decade. The International Energy Agency
(2016) shows that the Chinese have accounted for 30% of all capacity
addition in the renewables sector in Africa with an investment of US$
13 billion between 2010 and 2015, mostly from public funds. The
Chinese contractors undertaking these investments are typically con-
struction and energy infrastructure companies that develop the projects
on a turnkey basis under so-called engineering, procurement and con-
struction (EPC) contracts. In terms of capacity size, most of the Chinese-
Fig. 1. Solar PV imports to South Africa by major exporting countries (2005–2011), USD.
Source: UN Comtrade database utilising trade code: HS 854140.
Fig. 2. Solar PV imports to Kenya by major exporting countries (2005–2010), USD.
Source: UN Comtrade database utilising trade code: HS 854140.
Table 3
Imports of wind turbines into South Africa (2000–2016, total value US$).
Source: UN Comtrade database utilising trade code: HS 850231.
Total imports to 2010 from 2010
China 497,024,320.00 689,567.00 496,334,753.00
Denmark 367,908,423.00 1,450,615.00 366,457,808.00
USA 39,323,759.00 703,236.00 38,620,523.00
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built power plant projects are large, utility-scale plants, in particular
large hydropower plants: the average size of all projects completed,
currently under construction or planned is 188MW (International
Energy Agency, 2016). A similar picture emerges with regard to solar
power plants in Africa (Hansen et al., 2018).
3. Technology transfer and local capability formation
This section provides a brief outline of the theoretical underpinnings
that constitute the foundation for later sections. We draw on com-
plementary bodies of literature that tend to be treated in separation.
This paper seeks to bring them together in the discussion of local cap-
ability formation in the context of renewable electrification. The aim of
this section is, therefore, not to provide an in-depth review of the lit-
erature, but to briefly sketch the conceptual building blocks that are
combined in different ways later for a critical capability-oriented per-
spective to technology transfer. We posit that such ‘new combinations’
advance the debate about the opportunities and challenges for ‘sus-
tainable industrialisation’ associated with the provision of clean energy.
We draw on the following literatures:
• International technology transfer (Bell, 2012; Ockwell and Mallett,
2013), defined as cross-border flows of technology from suppliers to
users. Transferrable technology can take the form of ‘hardware’
(equipment and machinery) or ‘software’, i.e. knowledge, skills and
capabilities. Bell (2012) decomposed the forms of technology into
flows of (a) capital goods, services and designs, (b) operating skills
and know-how, and (c) knowledge and experience for changing
technology. There is, then, an increasing ‘software’ content in these
flows. Whereas the transfer of capital good hardware (in this con-
text, e.g. solar panel, wind turbines or biogas systems) may help to
provide access to energy, it does not necessarily add much in terms
of capability formation.
• Below the radar innovation (Clark and Chataway, 2009; Kaplinsky,
2011). Chataway et al. (2014, p. 33) emphasise the ‘trajectory of
innovation’ as one key contributing factor behind the increase in the
number of people living in absolute poverty in Africa because the
trajectory has been characterised by solutions that are large in scale,
capital intensive and, as such, better suited for richer countries.
Hence, this literature emphasises that the selection of technologies
that are appropriate in nature and scale leads to better outcomes in
terms of social and economic development and vice versa. The
global diffusion of innovative capabilities, not least to large emer-
ging economies such as China, India and South Africa, may change
existing unsatisfactory pathways.
It is in this context that the transition from production to innovation
in BRIC countries is gaining added significance, as innovation arising
out of these countries may prove more relevant in low-income settings
compared to rich-country alternatives (Altenburg et al., 2008).
South–South technology transfer is, therefore, increasingly seen as a
particularly promising avenue for enhancing more appropriate
innovation pathways in low and middle-income countries.
3.1. The importance of local capabilities and shaping of technology
There is increasing recognition that local capability formation is
more than simply a linear push of technology from the exporting
country to the importing country in a technology transfer relationship.
This paper aligns with the literature that argues that emphasis needs to
shift to the ‘receiving end’ so that the focus is on how technological
capabilities are acquired. In this respect, the paper highlights multiple
levels of agency that exists along complex technology linkages.
Acquisition depends on the type and form of user–producer interaction,
as well as the type of learning, that takes place (the importance of ex-
periential learning through importing). The focus is on importing
countries’ ability to select and deploy the most relevant technologies in
this respect, including the typical organisational arrangements asso-
ciated with such technologies. This echoes literature allied to innova-
tion and development studies, which suggests that technologies become
‘contextualised’, i.e. they are shaped by local organisational and in-
stitutional arrangements (c.f. MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985;
Sovacool, 2014)
As a result, there is a need to focus attention on the building of local
innovation system structures that recognise the relevance of imported
technology and promote the building of such systems. This requires
policy linkage between ministries that moves beyond rhetoric and local
content rules. Some have argued this is best achieved through the use of
climate-relevant innovation system builders or CRIBS (Ockwell and
Byrne, 2015) or what others have termed ‘system operators’
(Chaudhary et al., 2012; Lema et al., 2015, p. 180), which are key in-
dividuals or groups of individuals who successfully push for a func-
tioning and conductive policy environment and innovation system.
Ockwell and Mallet (2013, p. 120) therefore talk about the need for
policymakers and practitioners to start funding other forms of tech-
nology transfer and to ‘move beyond hardware financing’ as part of
efforts to build a more functional innovation system relevant for low
carbon development. They argue there is a need to focus on software
technologies because without these successful low carbon technology
transfer will not take place, nor will local capabilities be built to in-
crementally build on the hardware that is imported. This requires a
decentralisation of energy and industrial policy discussions in order
that local communities are engaged in these discussions.
This is not just a matter for policymakers. Fernández and Gavilanes
(2017) emphasise the active role that importers (in all forms) need to
play in investing in learning to absorb and shape technologies and
capabilities. This includes the need for service providers to talk with
local community governments to combine service level standards and
social standards to enable the democratization of technology choices
and enhance job generation.
3.2. South linkages and appropriate technology
As outlined above, a major set of debates considers the extent to
Table 4
Chinese power projects in sub-Saharan Africa (2010–2020).
Source: International Energy Agency (2016).
Generation capacity T&D capacity
Completed projects Under construction Planned and financed Completed projects Under construction Planned and financed
East Africa 14 9 5 10 10 1
West Africa 17 4 2 6 2 2
Central Africa 8 5 2 5 1 2
Southern Africa 15 7 8 4 5 1
Total 54 25 17 25 18 6
96 49
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which technology transfer—whether North–South or
South–South—provides appropriate technology to those being provided
with them. In the case of South–South technology transfer, we have
seen the importation into sub-Saharan Africa of a significant level of
embodied hardware; the amount from China has risen quite sig-
nificantly in recent years. However, China's engagements in infra-
structure projects in sub-Saharan Africa (not all specifically technology
transfer projects) are known precisely for their large-scale character-
istics (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; Mold, 2012); in agriculture, China
has established technology demonstration centres where seemingly
‘inappropriate technologies are piloted and pushed’ (Xu et al., 2016, p.
88).
On the other hand, studies of Chinese imports to Africa in the capital
goods sectors provide evidence to the contrary. Hanlin and Kaplinsky
examined agricultural mechanisation in Tanzania, furniture in Kenya
and apparel in Uganda and made a systematic comparison of northern
and southern, particularly Chinese, sources of technology:
Southern-origin equipment is distinctive by comparison with
northern-origin capital goods. At observed capacity utilisation rates,
southern-origin capital goods are economically efficient, accessible
and profitable to users, and demonstrably appropriate to operating
conditions in these economies (Hanlin and Kaplinsky, 2016: 361).
These authors examined the ‘intrinsic properties’ of southern capital
goods for manufacturing and agricultural sectors. they found tech-
nology to be both cheaper and more appropriate along several dimen-
sions (Table 5).
Corresponding studies have not been carried out in renewable en-
ergy technologies for electrification in sub-Saharan Africa. There is,
therefore, a need for more attention on the degree to which Northern
and Southern capital goods used in energy sectors, such as solar PV,
hydropower, geothermal energy and wind energy, are inclusive or not,
i.e. have characteristics such as those in the third column marked
‘South’ in Table 5.
4. Renewable electrification: linkages and interactive learning
Low carbon technology transfer is not just about the export–import
of embodied technologies. It is also, and perhaps more importantly,
about the software; the skills and capabilities from the outside that may
become internalised and shaped to help more appropriate pathways of
low carbon development. In other words, technology transfer is about
local ‘learning’ and the facilitating or inhibiting role that trade and
foreign investments play in this respect. We therefore now address low
carbon technology transfer as an issue about learning in GVCs, utilising
thinking from within the following literatures:
• Global value chains (Gereffi, 2014; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002;
Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000). The value chain perspective comple-
ments the technology transfer literature in two main ways. First, it
helps to move beyond a narrow focus on technology producers
(exporters) and users (importers). This in turn helps to decompose
the locus of learning between actors in the full range of steps in
which renewable energy technology is being designed, produced,
distributed, installed, used, maintained and decommissioned at the
end of its lifecycle. Second, it is centrally concerned with the issue of
‘power’, which is often neglected in the transfer literature. Most
studies in the GVC tradition focus on the role of powerful lead firms
that can influence the conditions under which other actors in the
chain operate. They have the power to specify designs, standards,
and requirements backwards and forwards in the chain.
• User–producer interaction and learning (Lundvall, 1985). Whereas the
GVC perspective is strong in, mapping out the sequence of activities
in product and service provision and in understanding the con-
straints to ‘upgrading’ in various points in the chain, it offers little
with respect to the actual mechanisms that contribute to such cap-
ability formation. Here, it is relevant to draw on the insights from
the learning perspective that arose from user–producer studies. In-
teractive learning can be defined as the exchange of knowledge
resources conducive to competence building and innovation.
4.1. Learning from importing
In the typical GVC setting, this literature is focused on ‘lead firms’ in
the North and the global chains that connects them with local suppliers
in the South. The key point is that chain governance (understood as the
co-ordination undertaken by lead firms from advanced economies) in-
fluences the possibilities for extracting more economic value through
learning in the South. The challenge is one of ‘learning from exporting’
so that local suppliers can upgrade by making better products, in-
troducing better processes or assuming new tasks in the value chain
(moving up the value chain).1
The underlying assertion in this paper is this literature on ‘value
chain learning’ is an overlooked issue in the debate about technology
transfer and particularly in discussions about low carbon sectors used
for renewable electrification in the South. We posit that the key con-
cepts and underlying logic behind GVC analysis is a useful, but so far
neglected, approach. Bringing this out and highlighting the significance
requires some explanation and framing of the typical value chains in the
renewable electrification setting:
• First, technology transfer chains are reverse value chains in the sense
that they are vehicles primarily for goods and services flowing from
advanced economies to low and middle-income countries – not the
other way around, which is the main focus of most GVC studies.
• Second, this means that the challenge is one of learning from im-
porting in GVCs (rather than from learning by exporting).
4.2. User–producer interaction in tech transfer relationships
Lundvall (1985) describes the elements of ‘user–producer interac-
tion’ as follows. Producers (a) monitor the users in terms of their pro-
cesses and products and (b) become involved in the implementation of
new products with feedback. They learn from this feedback. Users (a)
monitor the new technological opportunities among producers and (b)
draw upon producers when installing the new product. They learn from
collaborative problem-solving. In the context of renewable electrifica-
tion, the most important outcome is that users may learn by interacting
Table 5
Stylised differences between Northern and Southern capital goods used in sub-Saharan
Africa.
Source: Simplified from Hanlin and Kaplinsky (2016).
North South
Acquisition cost High cost Low cost
Scale of operation High output Medium output
Efficiency Efficient at rated and actual
capacity
Efficient at rated and actual
capacity
Labour intensity Capital intensive Labour intensive
Skill profile Complicated to operate; skills
for repair in short supply
Easy to operate and repair
by in-house staff
Repair Infrequent breakdowns; high
cost of repair work
Frequent breakdowns; low
cost of repair work
Access to spare
parts
Expensive and hard to find Cheap and easy to access




1 For example, Schmitz and Knorringa (2000) identified ways in which it was possible
to learn from lead firms and global buyers, while de Marchi et al. (2015) identified both
intra-chain and extra-chain learning mechanisms.
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with the producer and build capabilities.2
The outcome is likely to vary significantly depending on who are the
users and who are the producers. If the technology in question is solar
lanterns, there is a direct relationship from manufacture through dis-
tributors to end-users of those solar lanterns, which are likely to pre-
dominantly be rural households. In this paper, we are not concerned
with consumer goods like a solar lantern, but specifically with grid-
connected electricity generation technologies or mini grids. In these
cases, users are professional organisations responsible for implementing
and running the projects. For many consumer goods, the producer
dominates the relationship between producer and user. The producer
may pursue market research and give selective information on product
characteristics through sales efforts such as advertising. Another reason
for focusing upon professional users is that they have needs that can be
defined by an external observer, while consumers more often act based
on ‘wants’ that might be impossible for the external observer to observe.
4.3. Technology transfer and appropriate pathways
The nature of hardware, such as capital goods and their design, have
intrinsic properties that are more or less inclusive (see Section 2). They
also significantly influence the type and nature of operating skills and
know-how and indeed the knowledge, skills and capabilities required to
engage creatively with the technology. It is often emphasised that
equipment is transferred without a corresponding transfer of skills and
capabilities for replication, upscaling and local innovation. But there is
little discussion of the relationship between the ‘equipment’ itself and
the processes that enable localised upscaling.
There is considerable scope for professional users to choose different
organisational models around given equipment. But the selection of
core technology has important ramifications for the subsequent tra-
jectories in terms of the developmental potential and inclusiveness of
pathways. In rural and renewable electrification, there may be alter-
native options available depending on economic and geographical
factors and the availability of natural resources for energy provision.
There may be important ramifications from choosing between tech-
nologies (e.g. wind, solar, hydro) and within each domain are further
technological choices (e.g. small wind versus large wind).
4.4. Trade-centred and investment-centred value chains
The prior subsections sought to frame technology transfer re-
lationships in terms of GVCs and learning from importing. This section
proceeds by discussing typical value chain structures in renewable en-
ergy and the implication of these structures for localisation and loca-
lised learning.
The value chain may be organised in a myriad of ways. In this paper,
we start from a simple distinction between two types of chains:
• Trade-centred value chains: These refer to international flows of ca-
pital goods from exporters to importers. They are typically used for
the transfer of relatively simple products with manageable trans-
portation costs. For example, this type of chain may be used in the
case of solar home systems where solar PV panels are produced in
the EU or East Asia, and they imported by a wholesale dealer in sub-
Saharan Africa before being installed in a village by a dedicated
provider of rooftop solutions. Small wind turbines may also be
transferred internationally in such trade-centred value chains.
• Investment centred-value chains: These refer to cross-border invest-
ments by internationally operating firms. They are typically used to
transfer more complex and capital-intensive products or systems
with technological characteristics that inhibit or increase the cost of
trade. Large-scale solar power is one example of a renewable energy
technology that tends to be organised in investment-centred value
chains. Here, Chinese solar PV lead firms establish themselves in
end-user markets through FDIs in large-scale solar farm projects.
From the end-user market, they organise construction of the solar
farm, using personnel and equipment from the home and host
country while importing core components such as the panels. The
diffusion of large-scale solar PV and wind for rural and renewable
electrification is typically organised in investment-centred value
chains.
Trade-centred and investment-centred value chains are ideal types
and two ends in a continuum. There are many variations of both types
as well as hybrid forms. This distinction is important nevertheless be-
cause it provides conceptual hooks to address how technology selection
and purchase agreements structure value chain arrangements and how
these arrangements have important ramifications in terms of opportu-
nities to localise the production of goods and services and facilitate
technological learning and innovation in host countries.
4.5. The ‘local content’ of renewable energy products and services
International technology transfer is contested territory because of
the economic interests at stake. Benefits, such as green jobs and profits,
are unequally divided depending on the way value chains are orga-
nised. In principle, the country undergoing the renewable electrifica-
tion process would reap most development benefits by undertaking all
steps in the chain domestically in terms of employment, learning,
productivity gains and local industrial development.3 But in practice all
countries, even large countries, partake in an international division of
labour to a certain degree. However, the risk is that renewable elec-
trification becomes an ‘enclave process’ with little local content and
with few linkages or spill-overs to the rest of the economy. The danger
is that renewable electrification processes mimic patterns found in
manufacturing, in export processing zones or in extractive industries
where ‘local content is limited, shallow and inefficient’ (Hansen et al.,
2016, p. 201). It is a question of choosing steps in the chain that are
feasibly undertaken locally.
Renewable energy value chains combine:
• Core technology manufacturing steps related to the production of en-
ergy-generating equipment. These steps are typically organised by
different types of producers.
• Deployment steps related to their installation and use. These steps are
typically organised by different types of services companies that are
the ‘professional users’ of renewable energy technology.
In the context of wind energy, Schmitz and Lema (2015) referred to
these as the manufacturing chain, consisting of the production of tur-
bines and their different parts and components; and the deployment
chain that involves the distribution and the utilisation of the energy (see
Fig. 3). There are big differences between these steps across wind, solar
and hydropower.
However, these elements are present in the provision of all renew-
able energy technologies, whether organised as trade or investment
2 The interaction takes different forms with different outcomes. Mutually beneficial
interactive learning is not an automatic outcome. Lundvall's (1985) study of the dairy
industry in Denmark in the 1980s showed that powerful producers limited innovation
spaces of users by framing innovation challenges in their own interest and by pushing
their own (overly) advanced solutions. Lead firm technology producers in the dairy sector
thus pushed ‘unsatisfactory innovations’ within the dairy cooperative user organisations.
This suggests that one needs to pay careful attention to the ‘direction’ of interactive
learning and innovation.
3 Trade economists argue that this comes at a price of a loss in overall welfare gains as
it effectively involves barriers to (free) trade to localise all of these activities. For ex-
ample, it could raise the prices of the products produced locally as opposed to simply
importing them.
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intensive chains. But their distribution between countries is different.
This is particularly so when it comes to manufacturing.
• In trade-centred global value chains, manufacturing core technology
are often based in the exporting country. The technology provider
and its networks of component suppliers undertake manufacturing
production and assembly and hence there are few or no opportu-
nities to contribute to, for example, component manufacturing in
the country of end-use (the importing country). As such, the po-
tential here is limited to the deployment chain activities only.
• In investment-centred value chains, on the other hand, component
production and/final assembly of core technologies is typically ‘lo-
calised’ to a much greater extent in the country of end use. For
example, material inputs such as cement is typically produced lo-
cally. Even solar PV technology transfer may be organised as in-
vestment centred chains, with the assembly of core technology un-
dertaken locally (IRENA, 2016: Table 7). The steps involved in
deployment are remarkably different because their location is ty-
pically tied to the site of installation in both cases.
However, trade- and investment-centred chains differ with respect
to the organisational separation of supply and installation. In trade-
centred chains, separate lead firms undertake the manufacturing and
deployment elements, whereas in investment-centred chains, there is
one lead firm that co-ordinates the entire range of steps.
The discussion of local content above sought to disentangle and
describe different patterns with respect to the location of production
and service provision activities and their organisational division of la-
bour. However, the discussion of localisation also needs to consider the
question of ownership. In principle, foreign-owned firms may undertake
all the steps in the value chains described above with little involvement
of local enterprises and/or local-staff. In fact, there is evidence of very
strong dominance of multinational enterprises in renewable energy
provision in low- and middle-income countries (McCrone et al., 2016)
5. Renewable electrification using solar PV and wind in Kenya
Technology transfer and the learning and development potentials
involved in technology transfer projects depend not only mainly on the
properties of the capital goods (hardware) involved. These potentials
also depend significantly on the organisational (software) arrangements
involved in the modes of diffusion. While probably the most important
element for local capability formation, these software elements are also
the least understood. As such, this is uncharted territory.
Table 6 draws mainly on Hansen et al. (2018) who analysed the
sectoral innovation systems for solar PV and wind in Kenya, examining
large-scale (grid connected) and small-scale (mini grid) segments for
both technologies. The table draws on some specific Kenyan examples
of non-representative cases; as such it is heuristic and not intended as a
generalizable picture.
The following sub-sections discuss the potentials for learning and
innovation in each step of the two chains with specific references to
examples in Kenya. Kenya is a relevant country of study because it is
regarded as one of the exemplar countries in sub-Saharan Africa for
renewables use and has historically had a much more established local
manufacturing base than many other sub-Saharan countries.
5.1. Manufacturing chain
When it comes to the core focus of this paper, i.e. local capability
formation and industrial development in renewable energy industries in
Africa, there is very little evidence of this taking place within the
manufacturing chain. In Kenya, large-scale wind projects, such as the
Lake Turkana Wind Project, are utilising European turbines that are
designed, engineered, assembled and manufactured by European firms
(although using manufacturing sites in China). Even where large-scale
projects with and South-driven chains are in evidence (e.g. the new
solar PV Garissa project), all important stages of the manufacturing
chain are conducted in China (Bellini, 2017). Hence, in the case of
large-scale renewable energy projects in Kenya, local companies typi-
cally are primarily involved in the site construction activities, including
the building of roads, site offices and electricity transmission lines
(Hansen, 2017). With small-scale projects, however, there is a more
nuanced picture. Regarding wind turbines, Vanheule (2012) dis-
tinguished between three types of wind turbines: imported, locally
produced and sold in Kenya. To this comes a fourth category, which
Fig. 3. Generic manufacturing and deployment chain. Drawing on and Schmitz and Lema (2015) and Lema et al. (2016).
Table 6
Stylised differences between Northern and Southern renewable energy technology transfer linkages in sub-Saharan Africa: the example of solar PV and wind in Kenya.
Source: Based on information from Tigabu (2016) and Hansen et al. (2018).
North-driven South-driven
Manufacturing Manufactured in Europe and imported in trade-centred value chains (mini-
grid) or investment-centred value chains (large-scale projects).
Manufactured in China and imported in investment- centred VCs
(large-scale projects).




The situation is changing with local production facilities of solar PV starting up and local wind turbine manufacturing capability having always been
present (but not popular for electrification, although this might change due to a project to encourage development of small wind turbines in Kenya by
Danish company Vestas.
Deployment European contractors/subcontractors predominately manage all aspects of
the deployment chain, but some use African financing, subcontractors in
construction phase, and, increasingly, local actors involved in operations
and maintenance. There is often more local input when the project is on a
smaller scale.
Chinese finance, Chinese project managers and construction firms,
and often Chinese engineers utilised, although with a phase-out
period (sometimes very long).
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involves wind turbines with capacities significantly above 10 kW and
up to 850 kW used in the large-scale wind power plants constructed in
Kenya (Table 7).
The value chain related to the first category of so-called 'informal
manufacturing' is highly localised and characterised by relatively
simple and short linkages between local producers of small-scale 'Jua
Kali' wind turbines (20–300W) and suppliers of various kinds of locally
available input materials. These local (informal) producers typically
consist of local welders, craftsmen, electricians and mechanics, who are
involved in the design, manufacture and sale of these small-scale wind
turbines themselves, mainly to supply rural households and farmers
(see Fig. 4). The technologies are small and relatively simple systems
that are developed based on their own designs mainly from the copy
and imitation of imported goods, catalogues and from other local ar-
tisans (Vanheule, 2012).
The second category of so-called 'formal manufacturing' of wind
turbines with a higher capacity (200W to 10 kW) involves a smaller
number of enterprises with a formal license to operate, which among
others include the companies Craftskills, WindGen (now called
PowerGen), WinAfrique, Access:Energy and Chloride Exide (AHK,
2013; Carbon Africa Limited, 2015) These companies produce wind
turbines in local factories mainly based on open source designs and by
using locally available spare parts and materials. Vanheule (2012) es-
timated that in 2012, such local producers had sold around
120–150 turbines in this category in Kenya. The wind turbines are sold
under their own company brand names primarily to prosperous
households, businesses and organisations. The wind turbine suppliers
are involved in all aspects, from production to installation and main-
tenance.
As shown in Fig. 3, this typically involves local production and as-
sembly of the wind turbines, including import of critical parts and after-
sale service to customers. Some of the companies involved in importing
wind turbines are considering importing Chinese systems to reduce the
costs of their products, but the equipment for small-scale wind is ty-
pically provided by small specialised suppliers (Kamp and Vanheule,
2015). In this context, it should be noted that some of the global lead
firms are beginning to take an interest in this segment. Danish wind
turbine company Vestas has started a new project focusing on the de-
velopment of a small-scale wind turbine for sale in Kenya, which is
intended to include locally produced components (SustainableEnergy,
2017).
The third category of wind turbines in the Kenyan market involves
the import of fully operational, pre-fabricated systems from renowned
wind turbine suppliers abroad. Around 20 companies in Kenya are in-
volved in import of importing such systems, which include companies
such as EAWEL and Davis & Shirtliff, who mainly operate as whole-
salers and distributors (Kamp and Vanheule, 2015). Finally, in the value
chain related to large-scale wind power projects planned and con-
structed in Kenya, lead firms in co-operation with international con-
struction and engineering companies play an essential role in all stages
related to the import, installation and operation of the wind turbines
used in the plants. In these projects, lead firms, such as Vestas, General
Electric and Iberdrola, are typically involved as total system suppli-
ers—in so-called engineering, procurement and construction (EPC)
contracts—under which they are responsible for the detailed en-
gineering design of the project, the procurement of all the equipment
and materials necessary, and the construction and delivery of a fully
operational (turnkey) plant to their clients.
In the area of small-scale solar PV, the majority of projects that were
Table 7
Types of wind turbines manufactured and imported in Kenya.
Source: Modified from Vanheule (2012) and Hansen et al. (2018).
Local production Imports

















Efficiency Low Medium High Very high
Cost Very low–low Medium High Very high





















Fig. 4. Value chains for wind turbines in Kenya. Source: Hansen (2017).
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undertaken over the last 10 years have predominately utilised equip-
ment wholly manufactured in European countries or the USA. Now,
cheaper Chinese PV modules are available and a local manufacturing
facility in Kenya called Solinc (previously Ubbink). The plant at the
Strathmore University (0.6MW) uses key components from European
and Chinese suppliers (including panels from JinkoSolar and inverters
from Solaredge). It is interesting to note that local manufacturing fa-
cilities for solar PV have been established in other African countries too,
including Senegal, South Africa and Mozambique. These local assembly
plants involve South–South co-operation, for example through direct
engagement by the Indian government in the establishment of the solar
assembly plant in Mozambique (Nygaard et al., 2017), the direct role of
Chinese lead firms in setting up solar assembly plants in South Africa
(Baker and Sovacool, 2017) and linkages to Chinese equipment in the
case of the assembly plant in Senegal (Nygaard and Hansen, 2016).
That said, in Kenya, a Dutch company set up the solar PV manu-
facturing facility and a tag line on their website reads, ‘Engineered in
Europe, manufactured in Kenya’ (Ubbink/Solinc, 2017). Other com-
ponents required in solar PV systems are also manufactured in Kenya,
notably lead acid batteries by, for example, Chloride Exide and Asso-
ciated Battery Manufacturers Ltd.
The situation within the manufacturing value chain highlights a
complex situation, particularly in small-scale projects where we do not
have a clear-cut difference between North- and South-driven chains in
terms of whether they are trade or investment chains. In both cases, the
situation appears to be ripe for a significant level of ‘learning through
importing’ unless, over time, local manufacturing capability is in-
creased, thus enabling more locally focused firms of interactive
learning.
In large-scale projects, there appears to be a clearer difference be-
tween Southern-oriented (or at least Chinese-dominated) chains and
Northern ones in the degree of focus on investment-centred chain ac-
tivities. In terms of functional upgrading, i.e. moving towards higher
value-added activities with increased skills content, the establishment
of local assembly and production could function as a starting point for
the typical industrialisation trajectory identified in the GVC literature
(Hobday, 1995). Local production of towers could conceivably mate-
rialise, such as under license agreements with foreign technology sup-
pliers, as have been observed in South Africa, for example (Rennkamp
and Boyd, 2015). Local construction companies could also acquire
project-related engineering capabilities from lead firms through their
involvement as sub-contractors in large-scale projects.
Over time, this may enable the local companies to independently
venture into the development of projects based on the accumulated
expertise from prior project involvement. However, as shown in Fig. 5.
It should be remembered that local production typically involves the
lowest value-added activity in the value chain. Further, the profitability
for local companies to produce locally should be considered in light of
the increasing competition from the import of Chinese and Indian
components. As highlighted by Ockwell and Byrne (2016, p. 97), local
manufacturing of solar components in Kenya ‘has almost disappeared as
a result of Chinese-made products coming into the Kenyan market’, as
‘Chinese firms were able to manufacture them with higher quality and
lower prices than Kenyan firms’. Accordingly, the relatively limited
degree of local production of key components and products in the re-
newable energy sectors in Kenya and across Africa may not be sur-
prising.
5.2. Deployment chain
We would argue that it is in the deployment chain where we see the
most opportunities for local capability building currently taking place
in solar PV and wind in Kenya. This is not surprising given the infancy
of the local manufacturing sector in Kenya in these two areas of re-
newable energy. Most of these opportunities are found in the down-
stream activities of the deployment chain, notably the construction and
connection stage of the chain, and the distribution activities.
In large- and small-scale projects in Northern driven chains, there
are opportunities for local companies and individuals to participate in
the construction phases. In large-scale projects, such as Lake Turkana
Wind Project, different elements of the construction phase are con-
tracted out to local suppliers of everything from security and food to
construction of turbine plinths. In small-scale projects, the Northern
based companies involved often employ local engineers or workers to
help with installation/construction or have an explicit link with the
local community, organisation, household or factory to ensure local
ownership of the project through active engagement with the project at
all stages, including the construction and connection phase. For ex-
ample, Solar Century, one of the oldest UK-based solar energy firms, has
teamed up with Kenyan registered company Powergen on several pro-
jects including a 200 kWp solar and battery storage system and an
800 kWp Garden City shopping mall project (Powergen, 2017).
There is also evidence of the potential for capability building in the
last stage of the deployment chain in relation to distribution, operations
and maintenance. Indeed, in general, the further downwards in the
value chain, the higher the prospects for employment and value added
for local actors (see Table 8).
The downstream segments of the value chain include the entire
range of activities, from the primary import, wholesale, retail, and local
sales offices and distribution to the final clients and end-users (see
Fig. 6). In Kenya, an extensive network of local companies is involved in
the import, retail and distribution of components and products to the
final customers (Hansen, 2017). For example, many local companies in
Kenya are involved as primary importers of solar panels and auxiliary
components, such as inverters, charge controllers and batteries, under
agreements with foreign suppliers to distribute and sell their products.
Estimations suggest there are around 10–20 local companies in-
volved in the import and further sale of solar panels and auxiliary
components to projects and systems at various scales in Kenya
(Muchunku, 2013). These companies, which include Centre for
Fig. 5. Stylised representation of value-added and employment potential along the value chain: ‘smiling curve’ vs ‘sloping curve’.
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Alternative Technologies (CAT), Davis & Shirtliff, Solar Works and
Harmonic Systems, are typically larger businesses that offer a range of
products and related engineering and consultancy services. An illus-
trative example is the Kenyan-based company Solar Works, which im-
ports solar panels and inverters from German companies, such as En-
ergiebau Solarstromsysteme GmbH, Schott Solar and SMA Solar
Systems. Similarly, Davis & Shirtliff imports solar panels from Yingli in
China and batteries from Yuasa in Japan. In other cases, the importers
operate as local subsidiaries of foreign technology suppliers, such as in
the case of the companies Suntech Power Ltd. and Dreampower Ltd.,
which import solar modules from their parent companies in China and
Italy. Hence, there are both vertically integrated forms of relationships
between the primary importers of solar panels and foreign technology
suppliers, and other types of relationships that are based on sales
agreements and arms-length transactions.
In the downstream activities in the solar PV value chain in Kenya,
there are hundreds of retail shops that supply (mainly imported) PV
panels and other auxiliary components directly over-the-counter to
consumers throughout Kenya in local shops, supermarkets and stock-
ists. Generally, it appears that the further downstream in the solar PV
value chain, the more local actors are involved in the form of local
businesses, technicians and individual operators that are (sometimes
loosely) connected to solar distributors or retailers. Most of these local
entities are involved in the supply of small-scale solar (PICO) PV sys-
tems and solar home systems to customers in rural areas, which has
developed into a particularly vibrant local industry (Nygaard et al.,
2017). To illustrate the scale of this local industry, IRENA (2017) es-
timates that the two dominating local suppliers of small-scale solar
home systems based in Kenya, M-KOPA and Azuri Technologies, cur-
rently employ around 3000 workers in East Africa, of which the
majority work in Kenya (see also Rolffs et al., 2015).
As noted above, many Northern driven chains involving small-scale
projects have Kenyan companies and/or have a high level of connection
to the locally based client. Many mini-grid solar PV projects in Kenya
are handed over to the local community once built, and they become
responsible for their operation and maintenance. For example, Kenya's
electricity provider Kenya Power manages several hybrid solar PV or
wind with diesel mini grids for the Kenyan Rural Energy Authority
(REA). These were installed by a range of providers, including
University of Southampton, and through GiZ/KfW, but they are now
operated and maintained by the Kenyan power company or by the local
communities themselves (Muriithi, 2016).
Kenya Power is also retrofitting 22 existing diesel mini grids with
renewable energy by themselves. The Kenyan REA has also installed
over 670 solar PV systems for schools and healthcare centres in off-grid
areas, many of which are also now maintained on a day-to-day basis by
the schools or healthcare centres.
In large projects, such as Lake Turkana Wind Project, Kenyan en-
gineers have been employed to maintain the turbines; despite initial
expectations that only Danish engineers would be used in the initial
stages of the project's operational phase. Furthermore, the Ngong hills
25.5 MW wind power plant uses European turbines (Vestas and
Gamesa), but it is operated and maintained by Kengen. But in North-
driven chains there may also be significant involvement of Asian firms.
For example, in the Kipeto Energy Wind Park, the Chinese company
China Machinery Engineering Corp was contracted as the EPC con-
tractor, responsible for a large share of the activities in the deployment
chain.
When it comes to the planning and financing stage of the deploy-
ment chain, there is less evidence of opportunities for local capability
building. However, there have been local banks involved in financing
green energy projects in Kenya. For example, Commercial Bank of
Africa Ltd manages a credit line of 10 million Euros from African
Development Bank for the financing of green energy projects in Kenya
(CIO East Africa, 2015).4 There is less evidence of such engagement in
Southern-driven, or rather Chinese-driven, large-scale chains in ex-
istence in Kenya.
Table 8




Ingot, wafer 0.10–0.30 2–4
Cell 0.25–0.80 –
Module 0.35–0.70 3–4
Balance of system 1.60–3.60 1000
Distribution, installation and service
Fig. 6. Solar PV value chain in Kenya. Source: Based on information from Muchunku (2013) and Hansen (2017).
4 Key to the success of such finance is knowledge and understanding of the sector being
supported by the banking sector and vice versa. For the case of Pharmaceuticals, see
Banda (2013).
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The Garissa solar project, for example, is financed by Chinese
money and will involve a Chinese engineering firm that will then op-
erate the 55MW plant through a 25-year power purchase agreement
with the country's power supplier, Kenya Power (Construction Kenya,
2017). It involves Chinese technology supplier JinkoSolar and Chinese
project developer Jiangxi Corporation for International Economic and
Technical Cooperation Ltd.
The capability building found in this chain is less ‘hardware’ specific
(as in the manufacturing chain above) and often more ‘software’ or-
iented, due to the nature of most of the activities being service oriented
or involve operating skills and know-how, to use Bell's classification
discussed earlier. In addition, user–producer relations are key in this
chain in the more traditional sense of client (user) and contractor
(producer) than in the manufacturing chains where professional users
(project managers of large- and small-scale projects) dominate.
In summary, it seems that the insertion of local actors in the de-
ployment activities related to renewable energy value chains involves
significant opportunities for learning, capability development and em-
ployment creation. However, these activities may essentially be con-
sidered 'service jobs' related to imported technology and hence not
worthwhile supporting from a political perspective, given the limited
locally produced content and manufacturing jobs.
5.3. Capability building: linkages and local ownership
The analysis provided in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 highlights several
important points. First, it shows that the neat categorisation of South-
driven and North-driven projects is overly simplified. Thus, there are
often Southern firms, particularly locally owned Kenyan firms, involved
in North-driven projects. Second, this calls for detailed value chain
analysis at the project level. Third, Table 8 and description above is
merely a mapping of actors. Understanding the more detailed potential
for interactive learning requires in-depth studies of (typically very
complex) projects. These points highlight collectively the difficulty of
examining the creation, use and transfer of software technology in re-
newable energy services and activities. Paradoxically, the area typically
highlighted in the technology transfer field as key for low carbon de-
velopment is the most difficult to examine and distil for relevant policy
advice.
There are differentiated opportunities with respect to involvement
of locally owned firms, but so far their participation in these value
chains is often marginal. The capital and capability requirements of
large-scale projects tend to supersede those that are available locally,
except in some areas of the deployment chain. This is also the case even
in emerging trajectories of small-scale and distributed renewable en-
ergy provision. For example, Hansen et al. (2018) examined ownership
patterns of wind and solar power projects in Kenya (both small and
large scale) and found there was very limited involvement of local firms
in the organisation and development of projects in these sectors. In
other words, most projects relied significantly on foreign sources of
capital, technology, expertise and know-how, mainly from Europe. For
example, the Kitonyoni solar PV mini grid in Kenya was developed by
UK researchers and then brought to Kenya in a ready prepared con-
tainer for immediate installation (with local community members) in
the space of one week in 2012 (Energy for development, 2017). In a
similar, more recent example, two communities in Kenya have received
solar nano grids in a collaboration with other UK researchers under
what is known as the SONG project (Clarke, 2017). The nano grids were
again developed in the UK and transported in a container to Kenya and
put up in the communities.
In a similar example, one mini-grid solar project in Uganda was
based on technology transferred from Northern Europe (Mathiesen,
2015). This was state-of-the-art solar PV technology with highly ad-
vanced online control systems. These systems were monitored and op-
erated by the technology supplier in its home country, not by user
communities in Uganda. There was only little local involvement, with
Ugandan participation only in maintenance tasks related to non-core
elements, such as solar panel racks. More serious problems in core
technology (panels or electrical systems) required in-person attention
from supplier-firm staff. In this case, there was modest transfer of
technology beyond hardware and little local engagement with tech-
nology, which could allow for capability-building in Uganda. For the
Ugandan communities, the new system provided electrical power to
households in the villages where the system was installed, but the un-
derlying technology came as a ‘black box’. It was defined, installed and
operated from the outside due to a gap between system requirements
and local capabilities.
That said, in the Kitonyoni and SONG projects, there is local own-
ership, and it has been built in from the very start, even if the equip-
ment itself is ‘parachuted in’. In the SONG project, for instance, the
nano grids are run and managed by a local energy committee, and the
local communities have been involved in decision-making around the
design of the nano grid and what the energy produced will be used for
(personal communication with SONG project manager, 2017).
The examples of Kitonyoni and SONG, but also the involvement of
local Kenyan construction firms in the Lake Turkana and other de-
ployment chain examples outlined above, suggest that the issue is not
one of learning from exporting or learning from importing even, but
rather one of learning from participating.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has highlighted the need for researchers and, by exten-
sion also policymakers and practitioners, to take a stronger interest in
the conditions for local capability formation that arise during interac-
tions for low carbon energy projects. This is important, if we are to
move debates in this area from predominately focusing on access to
energy (Goal 7) or sustainable industrialisation (Goal 9) and consider
how these two goals can be developed in tandem through the promo-
tion of ‘low carbon development’. As shown in Section 3, there is a
rapid increase in trade and investment in renewables for electrification
in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper set out to provide conceptual framing
and substantiation for a research agenda focusing on local capability
formation in this context. This concluding section highlights the main
points and identifies key issues for further research.
6.1. Renewable electrification and local capability formation
In bringing together otherwise separate literatures to frame this
issue, we sought to provide a novel lens and associated vocabulary to
address the opportunities and constraints for local capability formation.
The key objective was to bring out novel perspectives that are otherwise
underemphasised in the literature on technology transfer and local
capabilities, namely those of value chain linkages and interactive
learning within them.
Section 3 provided a brief account of the relevant but diverse lit-
erature and perspectives in this research to situate the discussion in
relation to the state of the art and provide some basic conceptual
building blocks for the analysis. Section 4 then focused on the core
concepts of (value chain) linkages and interactive learning in the re-
newables setting in developing countries while Section 5 sought to il-
lustrate key value chain structures in the Kenyan solar PV and wind
industries. The paper is exploratory in nature, but gives rise to the
following general propositions for further investigation:
• Projects for renewable electrification differ in balance between
trade- and investment-centred value chains. Investment-centred
value chains, even if they are part of more complex sets of tech-
nology transfer, tend to ‘bundle’ requisite tasks that are organised by
the (foreign) investor. Trade-centred value chains, or the elements
of transfers/projects that are traded, may allow for more local
substitution of products and services, local participation and local
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shaping.
• Both types of chains can be subdivided into a manufacturing chain
(centred on the ‘core products’) and a deployment chain (centred on
the ‘core services’ and auxiliary products). Much literature on
technology transfer collaboration and value chains tend to focus
predominantly on the former. This can be explained, in part, by the
fact that this type of (embodied) transfer is visible ‘on the radar’.
However, deployment chains deserve most attention for several
reasons, even if the software elements involved are difficult to detect
and often highly complex. Many of these functions are labour-in-
tensive, tied to the point of end-use, and provide a main possible
entry point for local value chain participation and learning.
• The degree of bundling may differ in both large (centralised) and
small (decentralised) sets of technology transfers, i.e. renewable
energy ‘projects’ (Hansen et al., 2018). But decentralised diffusion
projects may typically involve higher degrees of unbundling. Such
openness in the organisation of value chains is associated with lower
entry barriers and more fruitful spaces for interactive learning.
We propose that these hypotheses deserve further investigation in
future studies of renewable electrification pathways and their specific
features.
6.2. Local capability formation: a role for South–South linkages?
The paper also sought to address the key question of whether and (if
so) why South-South linkages make a difference for capability forma-
tion. Discussing this question in general terms is difficult due to the
enormous complexity of the matter, with a huge variability across
different sectors and settings. The paper has sought to find a path
through these dimensions but falls short of any clear-cut response to
this question. Framing the issue in terms of interactive learning be-
tween professional users (importers) and producers (exporters), un-
derstanding the typical chain structures and their different learning
opportunities in and around localised activities, and laying out the
specific loci of such learning helps. But it is also evident that these steps
do not provide a clear-cut equation that can help determine the re-
levance of South–South linkages when it comes to local capability
formation.
As discussed, there are indications that transferred hardware tech-
nologies from the South may be more inclusive than technology from
advanced economies. But there is little to suggest that Southern transfer
linkages as such provide better opportunities for localised learning. In
fact, the opposite may often be true. Because of lower wages in the
South, Southern producers may have a higher propensity to do not only
core technology manufacturing and assembly, but also to undertake
deployment-related services and associated less sophisticated manu-
facturing—thereby crowding out and displacing local actors from the
most obvious stepping stones for learning. In other words, both pro-
ducers and professional users in such projects may be from China and
India, transferring mainly hardware and little in terms of software, and
creating higher entry barriers for local learning. This is the likely sce-
nario in many full-package deals (finance, manufacturing, construction
and operation) offered by some Chinese firms, which again leaves the
onus on promotion of local content and participation.
6.3. Promoting interactive learning in renewable electrification
The final area of discussion is with regards to the types of interac-
tions and learning that are important, but often neglected. This paper
has identified three types of interactive learning of special interest from
a development perspective. These will be outlined briefly below. These
forms of learning go beyond simply the uptake of new technology
(hardware or software) but are about forms of interactive learning that
will specifically create the opportunity for low carbon development; for
the promotion of firms that make products that alleviate energy poverty
and increase energy access while also building the industrial base of the
country.
• Interactive learning between contractors and local suppliers: As noted
above, there is a need to recognise the role of service providers and
local firms in the value chain and the importance of their interac-
tions with their clients, especially the main contractor of a wind or
solar PV project; this main contractor is essentially a professional
user (as opposed to an end-user; see Lundvall, 1985). Professional
users have more defined needs in terms of what products and ser-
vices they require and as such, a good level of interaction—which
focuses on learning the needs and wants of the other—between
suppliers and the main contractor will ensure a more efficient pro-
ject and should reduce delays. This is important on both sides, not
only for building up competences of local suppliers and their re-
putation in the market, but also reducing the ‘lock-in’ of dominant
sourcing policies of lead firms in a project setting (Hanlin and
Hanlin, 2012). Both are needed if strong backward and forward
linkages are to be created within GVCs. These need to be encouraged
by governments so as to create the development of dynamic cap-
abilities in firms and through these a stronger more diversified
economic base (Morris et al., 2012; Lundvall and Lema, 2014).
• Local labour learning to ‘use’ the new installations—operating and
maintaining: The paper has highlighted the importance of re-
cognising less codified knowledge and experiential learning that
comes through ‘doing, using and interacting’ (Jensen et al., 2007).
For more local content to be utilised, there is a need for local labour
to understand how different parts of the technology within a solar
PV or wind project work and are provided with the opportunity to
take over the ‘operations and maintenance’ part of the project life-
cycle. This requires not just a new mindset from lead firms in the
projects, but also government support of the relevant training and
education needed to ensure there are technicians and/or engineers
available locally to conduct such work.
• Public authorities learning to manage major projects: We have already
mentioned the importance of public authorities taking more of an
active role in regulating and supporting the sector through promo-
tion of training schemes etc. However, sometimes governments are
the ‘lead firms’ in projects: commissioning, managing and/or run-
ning the projects once construction is completed. This requires a
change in mindset for government departments as they need to start
behaving like lead firms and act in a more commercially oriented
manner than might otherwise be the case.
At the same time, this also provides opportunities for governments
to actively promote local content and linkages building proactively
through public procurement. Large, publicly managed infrastructure
projects – such as—of which large-scale wind and solar PV farm-
s—provide a targeted way in which governments can develop local
skills and capabilities that can go on to work on, and even manage,
other similar projects in the future. This is a mechanism that is not new
but has been promoted in infrastructure projects in the USA, China and
Singapore for some time (Wells and Hawkins, 2010). Unfortunately,
issues of corruption have often been cited as hampering such efforts in
African large-scale infrastructure projects (Appolloni and Nshombo,
2014). There has been an increasing interest taken in the role of public
procurement as a way of stimulating the development of local industry
in recent years, particularly in the health sector in Africa (Chataway
et al., 2016). We would argue that, despite the issues of corruption,
public procurement should not be neglected as an opportunity for local
skills building (Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Rolfstam, 2009).
All three of these types of learning may not arise automatically, so
one issue of critical importance is mechanisms for a priori planning of
interactive learning and again reiterates the importance of systems
builders and interactive learning to be encouraged at firm level.
Ambitious local content policies may enable a more active role of local
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firms, and such policies should be combined with investments in public
organisations for applied research and consultation that can be re-
sponsible for giving advice about establishing and operating renewable
energy projects. Having the necessary resources to engage high-level
international expertise on a permanent basis is crucial in this respect. A
major task would be to accumulate experience from projects, to develop
standards for projects, and to give advice on projects to maximise in-
teractive learning channels and to transfer local knowledge and ex-
pertise from one project to the other.
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